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KEYNOTE ADDRESS

Kiobel and the Multiple Futures of Corporate
Liability for Human Rights Violations
RALPH G. STEINHARDT†

I want to congratulate the Maryland Journal of International
Law for convening this timely symposium on the Kiobel1 litigation in
the U.S. Supreme Court. That litigation raises in particularly pointed
form the recurring questions of when international law provides a
rule of decision for domestic litigation, how the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS)2 should be interpreted, and whether multinational corporations
can—even in principle—bear legally-enforceable obligations to
respect international human rights standards. Let me begin by
offering a brief orientation to the Kiobel litigation, situating it in the
history of ATS litigation, and closing with some thoughts about the
oral arguments and the potential impact of this case on corporate
responsibility and extraterritoriality.
In its modern form, the ATS provides, ―the district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.‖3 In an audience this large and diverse, some may be
unfamiliar with some terms of art in this statute, enacted by the First
Congress of the United States in 1789. The ―district courts‖ is simply
a reference to our federal trial level courts.4 Every state has its courts,
†

Professor of Law and International Affairs, Arthur Selwyn Miller Research Professor of
Law, The George Washington University Law School. This Keynote Address was prepared
and delivered in November 2012. A Postscript has been added to address the decision of the
Supreme Court in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). I would like
to express my deep gratitude to the staff of the Maryland Journal of International Law.
1. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
3. Id.
4. See generally Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of
1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT‘L L. 461, 478 (1989) (discussing the decision of the
First Congress to vest the federal judiciary, rather than state courts, with jurisdiction over
ATS cases).
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and one of the interesting, recurring issues is the extent to which this
kind of case could be brought in the courts of each individual state
and under what body of law, but this statute deals only with the
federal courts. A ―tort‖ is a civil, non-contract-based wrong. It is
redressable through money damages. Civil law lawyers would call
this a ―delict.‖ Finally, the ―law of nations,‖ as referred to in the
statute, is the eighteenth-century equivalent of what we would today
call ―customary international law.‖5 This is international law that
arises out of the consistent and coherent practice of states acting out
of a sense of legal obligation. It is distinct from treaties and other
sources of international law.
Since 1980, when the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala,6 the ATS has been used to assure a certain
measure of civil redress for the victims of egregious human rights
violations when the abuser can be found in the United States. 7 In
Filártiga, a Paraguayan national named Joelito Filártiga was tortured
to death in Asunción, Paraguay, by Americo Peña-Irala, who was the
Inspector General of Police.8 Peña-Irala came to the United States,
and Dolly Filártiga, the victim‘s sister, and Joel Filártiga, the victim‘s
father, sued Peña-Irala under the ATS.9 The Filártigas were plainly
aliens, death by torture is plainly a tort, so the interesting
jurisdictional question at that early stage was whether a government‘s
torture of its own citizens constitutes a violation of the law of nations
or not.10 The precedent on that particular issue was not favorable to
the plaintiffs because of the orthodoxy that a state‘s treatment of its
own citizens was not within the reach of international law, and the
district court dismissed the case on precisely those grounds.11
Drawing on a variety of declarations, treaties, constitutions, a
5. See, e.g., Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 237 n.2 (2d Cir. 2003) (―In
the context of [ATS jurisprudence], we have consistently used the term ‗customary
international law‘ as a synonym for the term the ‗law of nations.‘‖).
6. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
7. The Supreme Court has called Filártiga ―the birth of the modern line of [ATS]
cases.‖ Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724–25 (2004).
8. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
9. Id. at 878–79.
10. Id. at 880.
11. See id. (explaining that the dicta in Dreyfus v. von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.1976)
and IIT v. Vencap Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975) had led the district court judge ―to
construe narrowly ‗the law of nations‘ as employed in § 1350, as excluding that law which
governs a state‘s treatment of its own citizens‖).
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submission from the executive branch, and academic commentary,
the Second Circuit reversed, ruling that deliberate torture perpetrated
under color of state authority violates universally accepted principles
of international law.12 The consequence was that the ATS could be
used to recover civil damages for particularly serious violations of
human rights, even if they occurred in a foreign country.
Filártiga has sometimes been called the international human
rights movement‘s Brown v. Board of Education.13 John Ruggie
recently wrote, for example, that ―Filártiga v. Peña-Irala has been to
global human rights litigants what Brown v. Board of Education was
for advocates of racial integration domestically.‖14 That may be
slightly hyperbolic, but it does convey a truth in the way that a
caricature conveys a truth. That is, if you see a caricature of Barack
Obama, George Bush, or Karl Rove, it will convey a truth, but no one
would confuse the caricature with a portrait or a photograph. So too it
seems that there is something being said with a certain ―truthiness‖
quotient in comparing Filártiga to Brown, but I would not want to
press the analogy too much.
It sometimes comes as a surprise when people first encounter
this ancient statute and this revolutionary case, but the fact is that, in
the decades since the Filártiga decision, a great number and variety
of abuse victims have obtained a measure of civil redress against
their abusers. For example, in more recent ATS cases, a Florida jury
found Augusto Pinochet henchman Armando Fernández Larios
responsible for the torture and murder of Chilean economist Winston
Cabello.15 In November 2005, a Memphis jury held Colonel Nicolas
Carranza, the former Vice Minister of Defense for El Salvador, liable
for crimes against humanity, torture, and extrajudicial killing.16 In
2006, a New York judge found Death Squad leader Emmanuel
―Toto‖ Constant liable for abuses in Haiti and ordered him to pay
nineteen million dollars to three survivors of state-sponsored rape.17
12. Id. at 880–85.
13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14. JOHN G. RUGGIE, KIOBEL AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 1 (Harvard
Kennedy School, Issues Brief, Sept. 4, 2012), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/mrcbg/CSRI/KIOBEL_AND_CORPORATE_SOCIAL_RESPONSIBILITY%20(3).pdf.
15. Cabello Barrueto v. Fernández Larios, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1326–27 (S.D. Fla.
2002), aff’d per curiam, 402 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2005).
16. Chavez v. Carranza, No. 03-2932 M1/P, 2006 WL 2434934, at *1–2 (W.D. Tenn.
Aug. 15, 2006), aff’d, 559 F.3d 486 (6th Cir. 2009).
17. Doe v. Constant, No. 04 Civ. 10108, slip op. at 13 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2006), aff’d,
354 F. App‘x. 543 (2d Cir. 2009).
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On August 28, 2012, U.S. District Court Judge Leonie Brinkema
awarded twenty-one million dollars in compensatory and punitive
damages against a former Somali general, Mohamed Samantar, for
acts of torture, extrajudicial killings, war crimes, and other human
rights violations that had occurred during the regime of Siad Barre.18
Recently, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Samantar
was not entitled to any kind of official immunity for acts of this
sort.19
Now we might ask, what is the value of such huge awards when
there is a decent possibility that no money will actually change
hands? To this, I can only reply with an anecdote from In re Estate of
Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation20—the first full-blown
human rights trial under the ATS. With Paul Hoffman, I was honored
to represent a number of survivors of human rights abuses in the
Philippines, and a multi-million dollar judgment was awarded. When
told that there was a good chance of never seeing a dime of this
award, this survivor of almost inconceivable abuse said something
that I have not forgotten in twenty years, and that is, ―That‘s okay,
it‘s enough to be believed.‖ It is enough to be believed. The
compensation would be nice if anything came of it, of course,
although the fight continues on how exactly this will be paid. The
point was that this survivor was able to use the courts of the United
States to have her story heard and to have compensation awarded.
Since that time and certainly after Filártiga, a small, cottage
industry has developed in international human rights litigation against
violators from a variety of countries,21 and those cases have been

18. Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04cv1360(LMB/JFA), 2012 WL 3730617, at *16 (E.D.
Va. Aug. 28, 2012).
19. Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 778 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that Samantar was
neither entitled to head-of-state nor foreign official immunity). The Fourth Circuit previously
addressed the question of whether Samantar had immunity from suit. Yousuf v. Samantar,
552 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010). The Fourth Circuit held that
Samantar was not entitled to immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act but left
unanswered the question of whether Samantar could ―successfully invoke an immunity
doctrine arising under pre-FSIA common law.‖ Id. at 383–84.
20. 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994).
21. Since Filártiga, there have been approximately 173 judicial opinions related to the
ATS. Donald Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of
Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709, 712–13 (2012); see also Roger P. Alford,
Arbitrating Human Rights, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 508–09 (2008) (explaining that a
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moderately successful to the extent that they conformed to the
Filártiga paradigm: an individual plaintiff suing an international
human rights violator, who is present in the United States, for a clear
violation of customary international law.22
A key turning point in litigation against multinational
corporations for their role in human rights violations was Kadic v.
Karadžić,23 in which the Second Circuit said, ―we do not agree that
the law of nations, as understood in the modern era, confines its reach
to state action. Instead, we hold that certain forms of conduct violate
the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the
auspices of a state or only as private individuals.‖24 We could discuss
when international law imposes obligations on non-state actors and
when it does not. After all, typically defendants under the ATS have
been police officers, military commanders, concentration camp
guards, and even former heads of state, as in Marcos.25 However, at
an increasing rate over the last decade, ATS cases have been filed
against multinational corporations for their alleged participation in or
their direct responsibility for human rights violations.26
It is in that vein that the Supreme Court heard Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., first argued on February 28, 2012, on the issue
of corporate liability, and then reargued October 1, 2012, on the issue
of extraterritoriality. The case arises because, in September 2010, the
Second Circuit held that corporations cannot properly be sued under
the ATS for violations of customary international law.27 The Second

cottage industry of international human rights litigation has emerged even though there has
only been a small percentage of successful claims).
22. See generally Sandra Coliver, Jennie Green & Paul Hoffman, Holding Human Rights
Violators Accountable by Using International Law in U.S. Courts: Advocacy Efforts and
Complementary Strategies, 19 EMORY INT‘L L. REV. 169, 173–86 (2005) (assessing the
success of ATS cases and discussing the impact of these cases on the development of human
rights law).
23. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
24. Id. at 239.
25. In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d at 1469. Defendant Ferdinand Marcos
served as President of the Philippines, and during his presidency ―up to 10,000 people were
allegedly tortured, summarily executed, or disappeared at the hands of military intelligence
personnel acting pursuant to martial law declared by Marcos in 1971.‖ Id.
26. See Jonathan C. Drimmer & Sarah R. Lamoree, Think Globally, Sue Locally: Trends
and Out-of-Court Tactics in Transnational Tort Actions, 29 BERKELEY J. INT‘L L. 456, 460
(2011) (explaining that of the 155 ATS cases that plaintiffs have filed against corporations,
125 of those cases have arisen in the last fifteen years).
27. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 145 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 133 S.
Ct. 1659 (2013).
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Circuit found that executives, individual managers, and individuals
within the corporation might be sued, but not the corporation itself.28
The Second Circuit‘s holding was odd because a number of
cases in the Second Circuit had simply assumed that corporations
could be liable under the ATS and proceeded on that very
assumption. For example, the Second Circuit had specifically allowed
an ATS claim to go forward against the pharmaceutical company
Pfizer for allegedly testing an anti-meningitis drug on Nigerian
children without informed consent, a case that ultimately settled.29
The Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have explicitly
rejected the blanket rule that corporations can in no circumstances
bear liability under international law and are therefore exempt from
subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS.30 They have all decided
that the corporations can bear a measure of responsibility under
international law and that the ATS would be a proper way to enforce
it. Doubtless, the split among the circuit courts is what led the
Supreme Court to review the Kiobel case, and, in an effort to resolve
that split, the Justice Department, joined by the State Department and
the Commerce Department, filed an amicus brief supporting the
Petitioners on the issue of whether corporations could in principle
bear obligations under international law.31
Just a week after the first oral argument in Kiobel, the Court
issued an order restoring the case to the calendar for reargument. The
last time the Supreme Court did that was Citizens United v. FEC32
and that turned out just fine, so the assumption was that this would be
just another example of something small like that! Specifically, the
parties were directed to file supplemental briefs addressing the
following question: ―Whether and under what circumstances the
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows courts to recognize a
28. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 149.
29. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009).
30. See, e.g., Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Flomo v.
Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 2011); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC,
671 F.3d 736, 747–48 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. granted, vacated and remanded, 133
S. Ct. 1995 (2013), dismissed on other grounds, Nos. 02–56256, 02–56390, 09–56381, 2013
WL 3357740 (9th Cir. June 28, 2013); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315
(11th Cir. 2008).
31. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 6–8, Kiobel,
133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491).
32. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
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cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within
the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.‖33 So,
instead of being a decision strictly about corporate liability under the
ATS, the issue became whether the ATS will recognize a cause of
action for violations arising extraterritorially. Judging from the tenor
of its questions in February, the Court seemed especially concerned
about the so-called ―foreign-cubed‖ cases, in which non-U.S.
nationals sue other non-U.S. nationals for conduct that occurred
abroad.34
One of the interesting ways to approach that question is to ask
whether that means that Filártiga and other famous foreign-cubed
cases, like Marcos or Karadžić, were correctly decided in the first
place. The stakes definitely went up with the Court‘s new order, but
one could be forgiven for thinking that the risk of loss to the plaintiffs
actually went down. The stakes went up because it could mean that
Filártiga—the very fountainhead of this inventive and humancentered form of litigation—is gone, but exactly because of that risk
the Supreme Court would need to tread carefully. A new Justice
Department brief was filed, this time without the State Department or
Commerce Department. Its position is somewhat difficult to decipher
because it said that this particular case should be dismissed, but that
Filártiga and its progeny were still good law.35 Thus, the Justice
Department threaded a needle that many would say does not exist:
both Kiobel and Filártiga were ―foreign-cubed‖ cases, both involved
egregious behavior by private actors in positions of local authority,
and both could be seen as furthering the interests of the United States
in a meaningful regime of human rights protection. The factual
distinctions between the cases—like the difference between a natural

33. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (mem.) (restoring the
case for reargument).
34. For instance, Justice Alito asked what business this case—involving twelve Nigerian
plaintiffs, alleging Respondents aided and abetted in human rights violations, and occurring
in Nigeria—had in U.S. courts. Transcript of Oral Reargument at 11, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659
(No. 10-1491). Justice Alito also raised the question of whether it was the Framers‘ intent in
passing the ATS to permit victims of the French Revolution to sue French defendants in
United States courts. Id. at 12.
35. Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Partial Support of
Affirmance at 4, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491). The United States argued that it was
not necessary to question Filártiga, as the circumstances in Filártiga are ―consistent with the
foreign relations interests of the United States‖ and ―Congress has created a statutory cause
of action for the conduct at issue in Filártiga.‖ Id. at 4–5. The United States argued that the
circumstances in Kiobel were different, primarily because ―the alleged primary tortfeasor is a
foreign sovereign and the defendant is a foreign corporation of a third country.‖ Id. at 5.
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and juridical person—did not connect in any obvious way with the
issue of extraterritoriality.
In addition, if foreign-cubed cases were not allowed under the
ATS, the Supreme Court‘s 2004 decision in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain36 would be inexplicable. In Sosa, a case in which I appeared
with Paul Hoffman as co-counsel to Dr. Alvarez-Machain, the
Supreme Court had to decide whether a Mexican doctor who was
abducted from Mexico and brought to trial in the United States for a
crime that occurred in Mexico could sue one of the kidnappers under
the ATS.37 The ultimate decision from the Supreme Court is a
cautionary tale, because it suggests that courts must determine in
future ATS cases whether a human rights claim satisfies a very
demanding standard of evidence. Specifically, the case must ―rest on
a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and
defined with specificity comparable to the features of the 18thcentury paradigms we have recognized.‖38 I am not sure that most
lawyers would know what an eighteenth-century paradigm is if it bit
them in the retainer; however, the fact that the Supreme Court cited
Filártiga, Karadžić, and Marcos with approval in Sosa39 suggests
that certain norms do satisfy this demanding but entirely traditional
standard. It is a strict standard, but it can be traced to the Supreme
Court‘s decisions in Paquete Habana40 and its antecedents about how
lawyers go about proving the content of international law.
Demanding as the standard is, of the hundreds of ATS cases that
had been decided at the time of the Sosa decision, the only one that
the Supreme Court disapproved was Sosa itself. That is, the lower
courts had ruled in favor of Alvarez-Machain, and that is the only
decision that the Supreme Court decided was wrongly resolved.
Certainly, since the Sosa decision, claims for torture, genocide,
violations of the laws of war, crimes against humanity, and slavery,
among others, have been held to satisfy Sosa‘s rule of evidence,
much as they did before Sosa. From that perspective, Justice Scalia

36. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
37. Id. at 697.
38. Id. at 725.
39. Id. at 732.
40. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (―[W]here there is no treaty and no controlling executive or
legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized
nations . . . .‖).
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has it exactly right in his separate opinion in Sosa,41 which is to say
that the Court had offered an extensive analysis but did not actually
change the standard or the result in any case other than Sosa itself. In
effect, the Court had set the table for a feast but served a nut.
With this idea post-Sosa that the ATS door is slightly ―ajar‖ for
the recognition of additional causes of action, it is certainly true that
rhetorically Sosa looks like a slap down to plaintiffs‘ lawyers. Yet, it
turns out to be a radical restriction on ATS litigation only to those
people—generally defense counsel and the academic self-styled
revisionists—who had overstated the threat of ATS jurisdiction in the
first place. That is, if you exaggerate the reach of the ATS instead of
looking at the decisions that actually separate the wheat from the
chaff, then you could conclude that Sosa‘s rhetoric of moderation is a
significant restriction. I think that misses the mark because the courts
have never thought that they could make something up and call it
customary international law. And nothing in the analysis or result of
Sosa turned on the fact that it was a classic foreign-cubed case: an
alien sued an alien for wrongs committed in a foreign territory.
Before exploring the oral argument in Kiobel, let me just take a
moment to observe that litigation under the ATS, though relatively
obscure and somewhat specialized, raises characteristic and recurring
questions about the relationship between domestic and international
law in domestic courts, whether under the ATS or not. In other
words, to really appreciate the sharpness and longevity of the postFilártiga controversy is to understand principles of more general
concern to lawyers, even those who are not human rights advocates.
Ultimately, the process by which international law and domestic law
have converged in our time would have been unthinkable to a prior
generation of lawyers. So Filártiga litigation arises in a specialized
setting, but the kinds of issues that it raises seem to me deeply
characteristic of how law will be practiced in the twenty-first century.
Let me finally say a few words about the oral argument itself.
Winston Churchill allegedly said there is nothing more exhilarating
than to be shot at without result,42 and that is a bit what it felt like at
the reargument in the Supreme Court. It is in marked contrast to the
way it felt last February, when Paul Hoffman barely got his argument
out on corporate liability, because some of the more vocal members
41. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 750 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
42. WILLIAM MANCHESTER, THE LAST LION: WINSTON SPENCER CHURCHILL, VISION OF
GLORY, 1874-1932 228 (1983).
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of the Court could not get past the question of why this case was in
the United States in the first place.
I want to suggest that, from the perspective of international law,
the ―extraterritoriality‖ question has a pretty straightforward answer,
and that the Supreme Court‘s decision in Kiobel throws that clarity
out the window.
First, as noted, the courts of the United States have long
recognized a cause of action under the ATS for violations of the law
of nations occurring within the territory of another state. That is
subject of course to having personal jurisdiction over the defendants;
they actually have to be in the United States at the time of service.43
Additionally, the notion that the courts will be open in this way is
subject to forum non conveniens considerations, comity, and other
limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction that apply in any
transnational case;44 however, so long as the underlying cause of
action in an ATS case rests on a specific, universal, and obligatory
norm of international law, nothing in international law prevents a
remedy in these extraterritorial or foreign-cubed cases; indeed, in
Sosa, the Supreme Court cited with approval a line of cases that took
precisely that approach.45
In contrast to the imposition of substantive U.S. law abroad,
which is sometimes a violation of international jurisdictional norms,
this line of cases has been recognized and respected as an
enforcement of international law. It is a domestic remedy for a
violation of a modest number of substantive international standards,
but distinctly not like the U.S. substantive law of securities
regulation, as in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.,46 or
43. See Int‘l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (―Due process
requires . . . that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not
present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it . . . .‖);
see also Supplemental Brief of Amici Curiae International Law Scholars in Support of
Petitioners at 27–28, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 101491) [hereinafter Steinhardt/Brenner Brief] (explaining that neither ATS or international
law overrides this personal jurisdiction requirement).
44. Steinhardt/Brenner Brief, supra note 43, at 28–36.
45. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (citing Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir.
1980); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475
(9th Cir. 1994)).
46. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
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substantive labor law as in Boureslan v. Arabian American Oil Co.47
Prior to the Supreme Court‘s Kiobel decision, the argument to the
contrary had been rejected by every court to which it has been
presented.
The reason for that remarkable unanimity over three decades is
neither obscure nor subtle. Unlike other jurisdictional statutes, the
ATS by its terms does not specify the citizenship of the defendant or
the locus of the injury. Second, Sosa-qualified norms, those that meet
the eighteenth-century paradigm test, cannot qualify as the kind of
domestic law to which international law limits on prescriptive
jurisdiction apply. It is not U.S. law that is being applied: Sosa says
explicitly that the applicable norm has to be derived from
international standards.48 It is true that federal common law—a
branch of domestic law—provides a cause of action, that is, the
mechanism for applying a substantive standard that is international in
its origin. But Congress did not pass the law governing such Sosaqualified norms as crimes against humanity or slavery.
We also know that the transitory tort doctrine, on which
Filártiga and its progeny partially rest,49 is fully consistent with the
international norm that every state retains the sovereign authority to
resolve disputes that are brought within its territory by the presence
of the defendant, again going back to the essential requirement that
these defendants be within the personal jurisdiction of the courts.
The ATS as interpreted and applied is also consistent with the
international obligations of the United States to provide a meaningful
remedy for egregious violations of human rights law and to prevent
its territory from routinely becoming a safe haven for abusers.
Finally, even if the ATS is an exercise in jurisdiction to prescribe,
which I deny, the restrictive international standards governing such
jurisdiction do not apply when norms within each state‘s universal
jurisdiction are involved. 50
If you have read the transcript of the oral argument in Kiobel,
you will see some of these very themes and a few others as well.
First, consider the following exchange between Justice Scalia and
Kathleen Sullivan, who represented Royal Dutch Petroleum, on the
issue of extraterritoriality:
47. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
48. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
49. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 885.
50. See generally Steinhardt/Brenner Brief, supra note 43, at 24–26.
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JUSTICE SCALIA: Ms. Sullivan, can I ask you about
your position on extraterritorial application. I believe
strongly in the presumption against extraterritorial
application, but do you know of any other area where
extraterritorial application only means application on
the territory of a foreign country and not application
on the high seas?
MS. SULLIVAN: Well -JUSTICE SCALIA: I find that -- you know,
extraterritorial means extraterritorial, but -- but you
contend that this -- as I think you must -- that this
statute applies on the high seas.
MS. SULLIVAN: We -- we don‘t concede that the
statute applies on the high seas.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Oh, oh you don‘t? Okay. I
thought that was common ground.51
There is good reason for Justice Scalia to have thought that this is
―common ground,‖ because Sosa, citing authorities going back to
Blackstone, recognizes that the ATS applies to pirates on the high
seas.52 It was therefore somewhat quixotic for Royal Dutch
Petroleum to argue that the ATS does not apply to the high seas. That
is important because if it does apply to the high seas, then the
rebuttable presumption against extraterritoriality, the so-called ―Foley
Brothers presumption,‖53 is overcome. Nothing in that presumption
as traditionally understood distinguishes between the high seas and
foreign territories.
Consider also this snippet, on the same topic of pirates, in an
exchange between Justice Breyer and Ms. Sullivan, when Justice
Breyer said:

51.Transcript of Oral Reargument, supra note 34, at 24–25.
52. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
53. Foley Brothers Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (―The canon of construction
which teaches that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply
only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States . . . is a valid approach whereby
unexpressed congressional intent may be ascertained. It is based on the assumption that
Congress is primarily concerned with domestic conditions.‖).
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JUSTICE BREYER: If, when the statute was passed,
it applied to pirates, the question to me is who are
today‘s pirates. And if Hitler is not a pirate, who is?
And if, in fact, an equivalent torturer or dictator who
wants to destroy an entire race in his own country is
not the equivalent of today‘s pirate, who is?54
Now you could say that Hitler is the modern equivalent of a pirate
and still deny that the proper remedy is an action for damages in a
U.S. court, although foreclosing that possibility as a matter of law
does seem inconsistent with the foundational Lotus55 decision of the
Permanent Court of International Justice. The essential lesson from
Lotus is methodological: a sovereign, like the United States, need not
look to international law for permission to act.56 It does not need to
find a green light. Those who wish to stop the United States from
doing something in particular have to find a red light. It seems that
there is no red light in international law for actions of this sort.
Certainly, in complete accord with Lotus, the absence of similar
arrangements in other countries does not create a prohibitory rule:
other states‘ abstention from a practice is evidence of its rarity, but
not its illegality. There is no persuasive argument that the ATS as
interpreted in Filártiga is a violation of some international law
prohibition.
The next most significant issue in the oral argument dealt with
ATS precedents. As an example, I offer the following exchange
involving Justices Sotomayor and Kagan and Ms. Sullivan:
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But you‘re asking us to
overturn our precedents.57
MS. SULLIVAN: We -JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You‘re – you‘re basically
saying Filártiga and Marcos, Sosa, they were all
wrong.
MS. SULLIVAN: We are not, Your Honor. Sosa did
not address the question we have before the Court
today.
54. Transcript of Oral Rergument, supra note 34, at 26.
55. S.S. ―Lotus‖ (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
56. See id. at 19.
57. Justice Sotomayor is referring here to Sosa and its incorporation of Filártiga,
Karadžić, and Marcos.
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JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel, how can you say
that? Maybe the facts didn‘t, but certainly the
reasoning of the case addressed that issue very directly
-- and basically said it does. And then it talked about
how you limit it. That‘s what Sosa did.
MS. SULLIVAN: . . . . And you don‘t need to
overrule Sosa, with respect, Justice Sotomayor,
because Sosa did not address, for better or for worse,
the extraterritoriality argument we make today. It went
off at the first step. No international norms,
specifically universal and specific -- sufficiently
specific and universal. So it didn‘t get to the concerns
about friction with foreign countries.
JUSTICE KAGAN: But, Ms. Sullivan, I‘m going to
read you something from Sosa, which -- it talks all
about the rule that it adopts and then it says: ―This is
generally consistent with the reasoning of many of the
courts and judges who faced the issue before it
reached this Court. See Filártiga.‖ And then it quotes
Filártiga: ―For purposes of civil liability, the torturer
has become like the pirate and slave trader before him,
an enemy of all mankind.‖ So we gave a stamp of
approval to Filártiga and Filártiga‘s understanding
that there were certain categories of offenders who
were today‘s pirates.58
When Solicitor General Donald Verrilli began his argument, he
laid out the essential U.S. position in a single sentence: ―The Alien
Tort Statute should not afford a cause of action to address the
extraterritorial conduct of a foreign corporation when the allegation is
that the defendant aided and abetted a foreign sovereign. In this
category of cases, there just isn‘t any meaningful connection to the
United States.‖59 Now there are a lot of qualifiers in that essential
position of the United States: the extraterritorial conduct of (1) a
foreign corporation when the allegation is that the defendant, (2)
aided and abetted, (3) a foreign sovereign.

58. Transcript of Oral Reargument, supra note 34, at 38–40.
59. Id. at 41.
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JUSTICE SCALIA: General Verrilli, the -- that‘s -that is a new position for the -- for the State
Department, isn‘t it?
GENERAL VERRILLI: It‘s a new -JUSTICE SCALIA: And for -- and for the United
States Government? Why should -- why should we
listen to you rather than the solicitors general who
took the opposite position and the position taken by
Respondents here in other cases, not only in several
courts of appeals, but even up here?60
This qualifies as a short but profound pushback on the U.S.
position. An honorable response to Justice Scalia‘s observation
would have been to say that the Bush Administration had taken
significantly different positions from prior administrations as well.
One of the reasons Filártiga and Karadžić went forward is that
presidential administrations in those times filed briefs and statements
of interest supporting the exercise of jurisdiction under the ATS.61 It
is true that the Reagan Administration came in against the Marcos
case. Although it filed something quite helpful on the Act of State
Doctrine, it argued that the ATS should be narrowly construed. To
which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals said something like, ―We
will defer to you on matters within your expertise like the foreign
affairs implications of the case, but it is the province of the courts to
determine what the law is, and there is a very important difference
between the meaning of a jurisdictional statute, as distinct from an
organic statute (such as might get Chevron or Skidmore
deference).‖62 It would have been important to say that the
Government‘s positions on the jurisdictional reach of the ATS have
not been consistent across the years or across administrations. It
would have been right to correct Justice Scalia and say, ―Well
actually, the original position filed by the U.S. government was quite
favorable to ATS litigation. And now we are simply reverting back to
that original position.‖ I think the overall idea, that this is something
of a will-o‘-the-wisp when it comes to submissions from the
Executive Branch, is exactly the point that Justice Scalia was trying
60. Id. at 43.
61. See, e.g., Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filártiga v. PeñaIrala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090); Statement of Interest of the United States,
Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (No. 94-9035).
62. See In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir.
1992).
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to make. From that perspective, it would have been worse to correct
the record.
Finally on the implications of the oral argument, a word about
the rebuttal and a particular hypothetical that Kiobel‘s counsel
worked on for a week in the run-up to the oral argument. The plan
was to develop a hypothetical that could be used at a key moment in
the argument that would do three things. First, strategically, it had to
speak to Justice Kennedy, and it needed to demonstrate to him that
there are certain kinds of cases that certainly should be heard under
the ATS in the courts of the United States. Second, the hypothetical
needed to demonstrate that the U.S. position was inadequate. From
plaintiffs‘ perspective, anything that gave the Supreme Court‘s
imprimatur to argument that ―we in the State Department get to
determine whether jurisdiction is appropriate‖ had to be derailed. In
addition, the special conditions that the United States had suggested,
especially the aiding and abetting qualification, were not persuasive.
The third desideratum was that the hypothetical had to be simple and
quick. So this is what counsel came up with:
Suppose there is an Iranian corporation that secretly
supplies poison gas to the current Syrian regime in
order to kill tens of thousands of Kurdish citizens. And
suppose after the Assad regime is overthrown, the
documents revealing the poison gas transfer to the
Syrian regime were made public and that Iranian
corporation does business in the United States.
Asylum seekers, who were driven out by the poison
gas attacks, are in the United States, maybe living in
the same communities as the plaintiffs in our case,
having gotten asylum. Would it be the case that the
Alien Tort Statute should not apply to a claim of
aiding and abetting the Assad regime and murdering
tens of thousands of its people? It is the modern-day
example of I.G. Farben. Is it the case that a modernday I.G. Farben would be exempt from the Alien Tort
Statute?63

63. See Transcript of Oral Reargument, supra note 34, at 52–53. This hypothetical also
addresses the personal jurisdiction issue—perhaps implausibly—by having the Iranian
corporation ―do business‖ in the United States.
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Coming at a key moment in the rebuttal, this was the longest
uninterrupted submission that any of the advocates got in the hourlong argument.
I will close with a brief look at what a win might look like, what
a loss might look like, and what either of them might mean for the
long-term health of alien tort litigation.
First, what would a win look like for the plaintiffs? A win might
have been that the Supreme Court embraced the rough consensus that
has emerged among the lower courts since the Sosa decision in 2004.
There are three essential elements to that consensus among the lower
courts. The first part of the consensus is that the cause of action in
ATS cases comes from international law, not from U.S. substantive
law. Sosa could not have been clearer that U.S. law does not provide
the substantive standard to be applied.64 Again, U.S. federal common
law is the vehicle for inferring a cause of action, but Sosa only allows
the enforcement of norms that meet that eighteenth-century paradigm
test: the wrong is only actionable under the ATS if it violates a
specific, universal, and obligatory norm of international law,65 which
again distinguishes this case from those precedents that disapprove
the extraterritorial application of substantive U.S. law.66 In short,
under Sosa, U.S. law provides the remedy but not the substantive
norm. What that might suggest is that this case is actually not about
the extraterritorial application of substantive U.S. law. It involves a
remedial jurisdiction, the power to offer a local remedy for a
violation of international standards, but it is not, in fact, the kind of
prescriptive jurisdiction that involves the application of a state‘s
substantive internal law to some foreign person or some foreign
transaction.
The second part of the consensus is that extraterritorial cases,
even the so-called ―foreign-cubed‖ cases, are subject, like every other
exercise of jurisdiction in transnational cases, to a variety of
discretionary doctrines available to the courts: the due process
requirements of personal jurisdiction; forum non conveniens;
possibly an exhaustion of local remedies requirement; possibly the
political question doctrine; possibly the Act of State Doctrine.
64. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 722–25, 729 (2004).
65. See id. at 732.
66. See Steinhardt/Brenner Brief, supra note 43, at 7–8 (citing Boureslan v. Arabian
American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (anti-discrimination laws); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl.
Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (securities regulation); and Foley Brothers Inc. v. Filardo,
336 U.S. 281 (1949) (labor law) as examples of such precedents).
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However, the idea would still be that extraterritorial cases are not in
principle forbidden. To the contrary, these discretionary doctrines
exist to derail cases to which the U.S. link is simply inadequate.67
The third part of the emerging consensus is that corporations are
not in principle immune from international standards. At some point,
the Supreme Court will address the original issue that came before it
and the suggestion that the Second Circuit got it exactly wrong in
suggesting that corporations were in principle immune from
international standards.
That‘s what a win would look like for the plaintiffs. What would
a loss look like?
I want to distinguish between what the plaintiffs might consider
the good ways to lose and the bad ways to lose. The bad way to lose
is pretty obvious: Justice Kennedy would repudiate Filártiga and its
progeny, and he would be joined by at least four other Justices.
Another way to lose that would be bad for the plaintiffs is for the
Court to indicate that international law is not to be taken all that
seriously; that as the Court did to treaties in Medellín v. Texas,68 they
now do to customary international law. The Court would perhaps
view customary international law as a branch of politics, and
therefore textually committed to the Executive Branch and therefore,
a political question under Baker v. Carr.69 That outcome is unlikely,
but it is a position that has been put before the Supreme Court.
Another possibility would be that despite Sosa and Verlinden v.
Central Bank of Nigeria,70 Article III is somehow violated by having
lawsuits involving aliens against other aliens. That position is also
unlikely to prevail, but it is the position of Harvard Law Professor
Jack Goldsmith as submitted in an amicus brief in Kiobel.71
It seems to me that the solution to a loss along those lines would
be to wait for a better Congress and to enact a Torture Victim
67. For a discussion of how these discretionary doctrines limit ATS litigation, see id. at
26–36.
68. 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
69. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
70. 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
71. See Supplemental Brief of Chevron Corp. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491);
Brief of Chevron Corp. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct.
1659 (No. 10-1491).
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Protection Act72 that is not limited to torture. Unfortunately, in
today‘s political climate ―a better Congress‖ may seem particularly
elusive, but at least this gives you an idea of what the strategy would
need to be. It is also fair to say that a loss like that would privilege
alternative litigation strategies: state courts, other statutory causes of
action, and potentially government contract remedies like debarment
for those corporations that do business with the government of the
United States on behalf of some foreign country in the course of
which human rights are violated. So, there are alternative statutory
causes of action and alternative forums.
The ―good‖ way for the plaintiffs to lose in Kiobel would be that
Filártiga and its progeny are preserved, but that this particular case
loses. One way to do that would be for the Supreme Court to adopt a
rigid exhaustion of local remedies requirement. So long as the
imposed exhaustion requirement were consistent with international
standards, the plaintiffs would likely be able to prevail in many cases.
After all, the politics of human rights abuse are such that, when there
are human rights violations, there tend not to be meaningful
remedies. The law does not require a futile act, and so remedies that
exist on paper but not in reality would not have to be exhausted. Still,
you could imagine a somewhat formalistic disposition remanding to
the lower courts for a finding on whether local remedies in Nigeria
were exhausted or not. Another possible, decent way for plaintiffs to
lose would be the U.S. position, whatever it is.
Of course, predicting the result in a case, especially on the basis
of oral argument, is a fool‘s errand. And by the time this symposium
appears in print, there‘s a very good chance that we will no longer
have to speculate about the Kiobel decision and its impact. On the
other hand, Supreme Court decisions often generate more litigation
than they resolve, and the cause of corporate responsibility will
persist in a variety of forums and under a variety of liability theories,
no matter how the Court handles the ATS itself.
POSTSCRIPT
Readers of this symposium publication will understand that these
remarks were drafted and delivered after the second oral argument in
Kiobel but are being finalized mere weeks after the decision was
announced. Rather than completely rewrite the history of the

72. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006).
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symposium, it need only be noted that the Supreme Court—
unanimous in deciding that the case had to be dismissed but split on
the rationale—left a remarkable number of questions unanswered, as
each of the four separate opinions explicitly recognizes.
In the end, the Supreme Court barred the Nigerian plaintiffs‘
case seeking relief against foreign corporations for violations of the
law of nations outside the United States.73 The majority explicitly
based its decision on the fact that Kiobel was a ―foreign-cubed‖ case,
a term of art traceable to Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.,74
and referring to the fact that foreign plaintiffs were suing foreign
defendants for conduct that occurred entirely in foreign territory. As
in Morrison, the Court held that the presumption against
extraterritoriality required the dismissal of Kiobel‘s action, because
―all the relevant conduct took place outside the United States.‖75 In
the next sentence, the majority made it clear that the Morrison
presumption as applied to ATS cases was not absolute and could be
overcome ―where the [ATS] claims touch and concern the territory of
the United States . . . with sufficient force to displace‖ it.76 Unlike the
precedents applying the presumption against extraterritoriality,
including Morrison, which turned on the language of a statute or the
intent of Congress, this new Kiobel presumption can be overcome
case-by-case or claim-by-claim, so long as the claims have
―sufficient‖ connection to the United States. Apparently content to
dispose of the case without further elaboration, the Court effectively
required the lower courts to give content to this new presumption.
The first level of guidance for future litigation derives from the
fact that nothing in Kiobel explicitly overrode Sosa v. AlvarezMachain,77 which preserved the possibility of ATS jurisdiction over
extraterritorial conduct. Sosa, which was itself a foreign-cubed case,
turned on whether the international norm at issue in an ATS case was

73. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
74. 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2894 n. 11 (2010); see also Foley Brothers Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S.
281, 285 (1949).
75. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. The Kiobel innovation also throws the relative clarity of
the Morrison presumption into disarray by distinguishing between foreign territory and the
high seas, which Justice Scalia rightly considered unprecedented. See supra text
accompanying note 51.
76. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
77. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
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specific, universal, and obligatory.78 The analysis in Sosa would have
been inexplicable if all ATS cases involving foreign conduct were
barred for that reason. To the contrary, as noted above, the Sosa court
cited multiple foreign-cubed cases with approval, including Filártiga
v. Peña-Irala, Kadic v. Karadžić, and In re Estate of Ferdinand,.
Marcos Human Rights Litigation.79 Without addressing, let alone
distinguishing, these precedents, the Kiobel Court simply determined
that ―all the relevant conduct‖ in the singular case before it occurred
abroad,80 but nothing in the Court‘s analysis undermined the Sosa
Court‘s approach to the ―relevant conduct‖ in other cases, even if it
occurred abroad. Notably, the brief of the United States in Kiobel on
the question of extraterritoriality explicitly preserved Filártiga and its
progeny even as it suggested that the U.S. connections in Kiobel were
simply too attenuated.81
This means in the aftermath of Sosa and Kiobel that ATS
plaintiffs must clear two hurdles: first they must show that the
defendant has violated a Sosa-qualified norm, meaning a ―a norm of
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined
with specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century
paradigms [the Court has] recognized.‖82 Kiobel did nothing to
restrict the actionable norms themselves, which will therefore
continue to include torture, genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, human trafficking, slavery, and similar wrongs. Second,
ATS plaintiffs must show that their factual claims ―touch and concern
the territory of the United States with sufficient force to displace‖ the
presumption against extraterritoriality.83
So much is clear, but the Kiobel disposition leaves several
essential problems in its wake, with no clear guidance from the Court

78. See id. at 748.
79. Id. at 732 & n.20.
80. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659.
81. Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Partial Support of
Affirmance at 19, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491). It is significant that the U.S.
amicus brief in Sosa explicitly invoked the Morrison presumption against extraterritoriality
as a reason to dismiss Alvarez-Machain‘s case. See Brief for the United States as
Respondent Supporting Petitioner at 46–50, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (Nos. 03-339, 03-485). It
was all to no avail: the Sosa Court did not even make extraterritoriality a factor in the
impressionistic determination of whether a cause of action would be inferred, 542 U.S. at
724–28, let alone whether jurisdiction was proper or whether a claim had been stated.
82. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
83. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
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about how to approach them. Here are the four most significant issues
remaining for future litigation:
(i) First, what kind of allegations are necessary to satisfy the
Kiobel test? The majority stressed that ―all the relevant conduct [in
Kiobel] took place outside the United States‖84 and that ―it would
reach too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices,‖85 so it
appears that the necessary allegations post-Kiobel will include the
kind of pleadings that have traditionally fallen under the rubric of
personal jurisdiction or venue or forum non conveniens. But the
vehicle for testing the adequacy of each complaint—and specifically
whether it sufficiently ―touch[es] and concern[s]‖ U.S. territory86—is
apparently a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than a
challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).
(ii) Second, Kiobel leaves open the possibility that the kinds of
allegations that suffice to displace the presumption vary depending
on whether the defendant is a corporation or an individual human
being. With respect to corporate defendants, given the level of public
interest in the case and the extensive briefing, it was a shock that the
Kiobel Court was utterly silent on whether corporations even in
principle can have international obligations to respect human rights
norms. As noted above, this was the very essence of the court of
appeals‘ decision in Kiobel,87 and was the only question on which
certiorari had been granted initially. In its Kiobel opinion, the
Supreme Court said only that ―mere corporate presence‖ was not
enough,88 which would have been superfluous if the Second Circuit
had been correct in its categorical exclusion of corporations from
ATS cases. In effect, the Supreme Court‘s disposition leaves the
Second Circuit as the outlier: every other court of appeals to address
the issue has determined that corporations do not exist in an
international law-free zone.89

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d,
133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
88. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
89. See Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Flomo v.
Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d
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Foreign-cubed cases against corporations that fit the Kiobel mold
are barred, but the Court‘s analysis and disposition also suggest that
foreign-cubed actions against individual human beings—as in
Filártiga and Marcos—survive. Those cases are not cited in the
majority‘s opinion and are not ―foreign cubed‖ in any event: they are
after all safe haven cases, in which the defendant commits abuses
abroad and then comes to the United States and remains. The
defendant‘s living connection to the United States distinguishes those
cases from the foreign corporations sued in Kiobel: they clearly
―touch and concern the territory of the United States.‖ That plaintiffs
in such cases should not come within the Kiobel presumption is
doubly clear from the fact that the separate opinion of Justices Alito
and Thomas did require that the ―domestic [i.e., U.S.] content‖ of the
claim must be ―sufficient to violate an international norm that
satisfies Sosa‘s requirements of definiteness and acceptance among
civilized nations.‖90 In other words, Justices Alito and Thomas would
require violation of the Sosa-qualified norm in the United States.
That would of course have blocked the Filártiga and Marcos cases,
so it is highly significant that the other seven Justices rejected Justice
Alito‘s restriction.
(iii) The third major problem post-Kiobel is what role
international law will play (if any) in determining which claims touch
and concern the United States. It is well-established that federal
statutes must be interpreted in light of international law, 91 and a
productive symmetry exists after Sosa and Kiobel: just as
international law defines the positive substantive norms that are
actionable under the ATS per Sosa, international law defines the
positive jurisdictional reach of the ATS post-Kiobel and the kinds of
claims it covers. In short, a strong argument exists that international
law provides authoritative guidance on the question of what kind of
connections should count in Kiobel‘s ―touch and concern‖ calculus.
Several doctrines of international law specify the kinds of claims
that should displace the Kiobel presumption. For example, the
doctrine of state responsibility determines the circumstances under
which a State may bear responsibility under international law. In its

736 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. granted, vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013),
dismissed on other grounds, Nos. 02–56256, 02–56390, 09–56381, 2013 WL 3357740 (9th
Cir. June 28, 2013); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008).
90. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring).
91. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
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authoritative treatment of this topic the International Law
Commission (―ILC‖) concluded inter alia that
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall
be considered an act of a State under international law
if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on
the instructions of, or under the direction or control of,
that State in carrying out the conduct.92
In its commentary to article 8, the ILC clarifies that even
unauthorized or illegal conduct by a private actor can trigger the
State‘s responsibility as a matter of international law:
where persons or groups have committed acts under
the effective control of a State, the condition for
attribution will still be met even if particular
instructions may have been ignored.93
Recognizing the potential for its own state responsibility
internationally, the United States requires that its contractors—
regardless of citizenship and location of service—operate in a dense
regulatory environment, profoundly controlled by the government
itself, all of which qualifies as evidence of the kind of contractor
conduct that ―touches and concerns‖ the United States.94
Similarly, the international law doctrine of jurisdiction to
prescribe catalogues various connections that justify the extension
and application of a State‘s law, suggesting that ATS claims that fall
within these categories displace the Kiobel presumption.95 So for
example, international law recognizes that every sovereign is
sufficiently touched and concerned by certain categories of conduct
that it can extend its jurisdiction to prescribe legal consequences for
92. Rep. of the Int‘l Law Comm‘n, 53d Sess., Apr. 23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10, 2001,
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 8, U.N. Doc A/56/10, GAOR,
56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001).
93. Id. art. 8, cmt. 8.
94 See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 804, 18 U.S.C. § 7(9) (2006) (expanding the
United States‘ special maritime and territorial jurisdiction to include U.S.-operated facilities
overseas by amending 18 U.S.C. § 7 to include ―the premises of United States diplomatic,
consular, military or other United States Government missions or entities in foreign States‖);
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (MEJA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261–3267 (2006)
(subjecting contractors to federal criminal prosecution).
95. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402 (1987).
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it: the conduct of its own nationals; conduct within its territory or
which has substantial effects within its territory; conduct that
implicates its national security or essential government functions; and
conduct that implicates a State‘s concern with certain wrongs that
threaten the international community as a whole.96 From this
perspective, Kiobel resolved the unique case before the Court, on the
particular facts alleged in that complaint, without offering much
guidance on the resolution of what international law might regard as
―foreign-squared‖ cases, involving for example U.S. companies as
defendants, corporate conduct within the jurisdiction of the United
States or under contract with the U.S. government (even if performed
abroad), or in violation of norms proscribing universally condemned
behavior (including those subject to ―extradite-or-prosecute‖
provisions of international treaties).97
(iv) The fourth major problem in the aftermath of Kiobel has
nothing to do with doctrine and everything to do with the mind of
Justice Anthony Kennedy. Concurring separately but also joining the
majority, Justice Kennedy—reaching new heights of what looks like
intentional obscurity—wrote:
The opinion for the Court is careful to leave open a
number of significant questions regarding the reach
and interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute. In my
view that is a proper disposition. Many serious
concerns with respect to human rights abuses
committed abroad have been addressed by Congress in
statutes such as the Torture Victim Protection Act of
1991 (TVPA) and that class of cases will be
determined in the future according to the detailed
statutory scheme Congress has enacted. Other cases
may arise with allegations of serious violations of
96. See generally I.A. SHEARER, STARKE‘S INTERNATIONAL LAW 183–212 (8th ed. 1994).
97. In the recent case of Belgium v. Senegal, the International Court of Justice examined
the obligation of aut dedere aut judicare within the context of the Convention Against
Torture, and clarified the nature and basis of the State obligation. See Questions Relating to
the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), Judgment (July 20, 2012), available
at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/144/17064.pdf. The Court held unanimously that
Senegal was required to take action to hold an individual within its territory accountable for
violations of customary international law norms. ―State parties have a common interest to
ensure, in view of their shared values‖ that acts in violation of international human rights
norms ―are prevented and that, if they occur, their authors do not enjoy impunity.‖ Id. ¶ 68.
Further, a nation‘s obligation is ―triggered by the presence of the alleged offender in its
territory, regardless of the nationality of the offender or the victims, or of the place where the
alleged offences occurred.‖ Id.
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international law principles protecting persons, cases
covered neither by the TVPA nor by the reasoning and
holding of today’s case; and in those disputes the
proper implementation of the presumption against
extraterritorial application may require some further
elaboration and explanation.98
Is this Justice Kennedy‘s veiled reference to Filártiga and its postSosa progeny? At a minimum, those cases do involve ―allegations of
serious violations of international law principles protecting persons,‖
and they are not ―covered . . . by the TVPA‖ because they involve
allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide or the
like. Nor are those cases ―covered . . . by the reasoning and holding‖
of Kiobel because they do not involve foreign corporations, or the
foreign corporate defendants are not merely present in the United
States or the claims have some other connection to the United States,
say by falling within this country‘s jurisdiction to prescribe.
Clearly, Kiobel invites more litigation than it resolves, which is
common in Supreme Court cases, but the Roberts opinion also invites
a lazy hostility to Filártiga-like cases that is simply not justified. In
the months immediately after Kiobel, a handful of lower courts
dispensed with the ―touch and concern‖ analysis altogether, holding
that so long as the alleged conduct occurred abroad, Kiobel was fatal
to the case, a position consistent with the opinion of Justices Alito
and Thomas but inconsistent with the analyses of the other seven
Justices.99 These early decisions suggest a willful misunderstanding
of the transitory tort doctrine and a visceral reluctance to consider
and apply the law of nations in both treaty and customary form as the
rule of decision in cases where it is relevant. Nothing in Kiobel
98. 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
99. See, e.g., Al Shimari v. CACI Int‘l, Inc., No. 1:08-cv-827 (GBL/JFA), 2013 WL
3229720, at *1 (E.D. Va. June 25, 2013) (―In light of the United States Supreme Court‘s
decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, the Court holds that it lacks ATS jurisdiction
over Plaintiffs‘ claims because the acts giving rise to their tort claims occurred exclusively in
Iraq, a foreign sovereign.‖ (citation omitted)). The corporate defendants in Al Shimari are
U.S. nationals, making the case ―foreign-squared‖ not ―foreign-cubed.‖ Compare Mwani v.
Bin Laden, No. 99-125 (JMF), 2013 WL 2325166, at *4 (D.D.C. May 29, 2013) (sustaining
jurisdiction over ATS claims arising out of an attack on a U.S. embassy in a foreign country:
―Surely, if any circumstances were to fit the Court‘s framework of ‗touching and concerning
the United States with sufficient force,‘ it would be a terrorist attack that 1) was plotted in
part within the United States, and 2) was directed at a United States Embassy and its
employees.‖).
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requires or justifies so profound a departure from the traditional
approach to international law as law of the United States.

